COVID-19 demands a stronger commitment to multilateralism

12 May 2020

Author: Hoang Oanh, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam

The COVID-19 pandemic is demonstrating that a single disease can cause more catastrophic damage than wars and conflicts. The crisis makes it painfully clear that a transnational threat requires a transnational response. But international cooperation has been mostly limited to the sharing of medical equipment and expertise. Multilateral efforts have been impeded by the return of nationalism and great power rivalry.

In today’s integrated world, uncoordinated unilateral responses will not stop the spread of a pathogen. Lessons from previous pandemics have underscored the need for multilateralism. SARS was a ‘wake-up call’, demanding intensive international cooperation and prompting the international community to take collective responsibility and implement the revised International Health Regulations (IHR) in 2005. The eradication of Ebola emphasised the need for enhancing coordinated multilateral containment efforts.

Pandemics not only inflict catastrophic human losses but also exert serious economic and social impacts. Expert assessments expect that the world is heading towards ‘the deepest global recession in history’ and only ‘cohesive multilateral cooperation’ can rescue the global economy. Effective multilateral food distribution mechanisms are crucial as millions are facing hunger, even when the world currently has enough food stocks. While necessary multilateral frameworks exist, their performance has been undermined by unilateral behaviour, especially by the big powers.

The World Health Organization (WHO) has faced fierce criticism for failing to show leadership as countries ignore itspandemic plan. The criticism the WHO has faced exposes the problems of current governance on global issues. It has been argued that the WHO was intentionally formed as a weak intergovernmental institution with little authority. Even the legally binding IHR does not have an enforcement mechanism. It is mostly staffed with scientists and technicians who lack the necessary political skills to strike a balance between its mission on global health and political realities.

Similar to climate change, public health has always had an uneasy relationship with politics. But the intensifying US–China rivalry, which has been likened to a new Cold War, is pushing the WHO into unchartered waters where it is paralysed by the political game of great power politics and is now under attack by its biggest donor. Its credibility and competence are questioned, its General Director called to resign and its existence threatened by US President Donald Trump’s decision to withdraw funding and consider creating an alternative institution.

Lessons should be learned from the WHO’s underperformance. Its inability to ensure a transparent and accountable handling of the outbreak in China has undermined its credibility and integrity. Its stance on travel restrictions reflects inflexibility when scientific research has shown the partial effectiveness of the measure in delaying crisis.

But the WHO still has a crucial role to play in monitoring public health risks, setting health standards and guidelines, and coordinating international responses when other parts of the world with weaker public health capacities are bracing for the worst. The WHO has also played a role in promoting a global commitment to accessible SARS-CoV-2 vaccines and warding off monopolising efforts by individual countries and private firms.

Other leading global institutions like the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), G20 and G7 also fell short of expectations due to US–China frictions. The missing role of the UNSC reflects the extent to which the US–China competition is defining the current world. Four months after the outbreak started, efforts to bring the issue to the UNSC were obstructed by a fight over the coronavirus narrative between the United States and China.

China, joined by Russia and South Africa, rejected the engagement of the UNSC, arguing that the pandemic is irrelevant to global peace and security while the United States held steadfast against China on the origin and naming of the virus. The first online discussion took place on 9 April 2020 at the request of nine non-permanent members but failed to produce any concrete outcomes.

The fact that the UNSC took an active role during the Ebola outbreak in 2014 invalidates the disengagement argument. As the COVID-19 death toll far surpasses that of Ebola and continues to rise rapidly, posing possible dual crises to many vulnerable communities, internal divisions and inaction will not only produce dreadful consequences but also damage the UN’s very justification for existence.

The US–China row over the WHO has also spilled over into the G20 and G7. The G7 leaders’ teleconference failed to produce a joint statement because of US insistence on naming the virus the ‘Wuhan virus’. G20 leaders committed to injecting over US$5 trillion into the global economy to minimise the impact of the pandemic but failed to issue a cohesive action plan. The US–China dispute also led to a cancellation of the second virtual summit, which will undermine joint efforts to tackle the health and economic crises.

Through COVID-19, we have paid a great price to learn that a unilateral approach is no cure for a transnational threat. While the pandemic exposes the shortcomings of current global governance institutions and reforms are needed, the immediate focus should be on joint efforts to contain the spread of COVID-19 and deal with its economic and social fallouts. A stronger commitment to multilateralism must be retained as acting selfishly will bring consequences that cannot be undone.

Hoang Oanh is Deputy Director of the Center for Regional and Foreign Policy Studies at the Institute of Foreign Policy and Strategic Studies of the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam.

This article is part of an EAF special feature series on the novel coronavirus crisis and its impact.

Coirtesy:,East Asia Forum

Australia’s diplomatic COVID-19 self-isolation

11 May 2020

Author: Editorial Board, ANU

Australia’s domestic response to the COVID-19 health and economic crisis has brought plaudits at home and from around the world, especially from commentators in the United States.

Key to Australian success in suppressing the spread of the virus at home was the rein given to top medical and epidemiological professionals soon after the threat became clear. Australia, by virtue of its motorised urban culture, its geography, the season and its medical research and clinical capacities, had some natural defences on call. There’s no doubt that high levels of interpersonal contact with China and the United States made it vulnerable to early spread of COVID-19. That was relatively quickly contained. Australian political leadership deferred to medical advice and, apart from a lapse in control around the Ruby Princess cruise ship affair, it’s the medical advice that has largely called the shots in containing the caseload — at least thus far.

The economic calamity wrought by health policy calls (blanket border closure and comprehensive shutdown restrictions) demanded a massive simultaneous economic and social policy response to alleviate the hardship that had been forced through economic shut down. But simultaneous it was not. The laying off of upwards of 15 per cent of the workforce overnight and the shockingly long queues of unemployed seeking inadequate social protection quickly focused the political mind. Again, despite initial reluctance, political leadership deferred to technocratic initiative in crafting a large-scale program of elevated unemployment relief and massive temporary income support. Although Australia’s large temporary migrant workforce fell through the cracks, as in health policy so too in economic policy, the experts were given significant freedom to call the shots and the political leadership wisely listened.

What comes next, as domestic restrictions are relaxed in the transition to opening up the economy internationally and when treatment or immunisation against second-wave outbreaks is still a ways down the track?

The technocrats may have shouldered the burden of dealing with the initial assault of the pandemic and the immediate impact of the health remedies on the economy with relative success. But the tasks of economic policy and international diplomacy that must have priority now are beyond the competence of the health and economic specialists. Political leaders now need to frame strategies to deal with the complex problems of recovery and reconstruction internationally, and forge the cooperation necessary to avoid prolonged stagnation and international disruption. That’s the next front in the battle with the COVID-19 crisis that all countries will confront, whether or not they’ve yet put their minds to it.

The global nature of this health and economic crisis calls for faster and better coordination among governments, rather than each going it alone, and underlines why multilateral cooperation is so important in coming through both quickly. Promoting international solidarity based on trust and sharing as a basis for collective action to deal with all dimensions of the crisis is central to success.

Australia’s diplomatic foray into COVID-19 geopolitics through its redundant proposal for an independent inquiry into the origins of the pandemic does not bode well for aligning interests in policy cooperation that’s needed to speed recovery. There is in fact furious agreement from Beijing to Brussels on the need for review into the COVID-19 pandemic experience.

The question was never about the justifiable desire for greater knowledge about the pandemic so that we’d be better prepared for contingencies of this kind in future. The question has been about the nature and the timing of an inquiry, as well as the febrile international political context into which the Australian idea was lobbed. There was no developed Australian proposal. There was no consultation with regional neighbours or partners and they, not only China, were bemused at Australian guilelessness in spearheading a Washington-touted idea. Australia’s regional diplomatic ham-fistedness was earlier on display in its ‘condescending’ attitude towards Indonesia’s ability to navigate the health crisis. While ASEAN, China, Japan and South Korea (ASEAN+3) were quick to call a leaders’ summit, declare support for the WHO, and establish solidarity in managing the health and economic aspects of the crisis together, Australia left itself dangling in the breeze.

Australia is in diplomatic self-isolation in the region in which the weight of its economic and diplomatic interests, essential to navigating vigorous and early recovery, is located. Australian diplomacy on COVID-19 appears an empty, echoing set. Later back-pedalling to distance Australia’s stumble-bum diplomacy on the crisis from the venal re-election politics of the Trump administration convinces no one but its proponents.

As David Fidler argues in this week’s lead essay, it is ‘political tensions [that] threaten to damage the global fight against the coronavirus’. The technical issues are more straightforward.

Many have made the point that Australia’s ‘captain’s call’ on an inquiry into COVID-19 independently of the WHO has put China on the defensive and will complicate the inquiry’s handling when it’s held. The WHO is not shy about the need for a review of its management of the crisis: that’s normal practice. As Fidler points out, after the West African Ebola outbreak in 2014 ‘multiple reviews scrutinised the WHO’s mistakes and recommended reforms, such as strengthening the WHO’s preparedness and response capabilities. The WHO took these recommendations seriously. When the Democratic Republic of the Congo suffered an Ebola outbreak in 2018, the WHO’s response was impressive. Similarly, the WHO has garnered praise for how it has deployed its scientific, medical and public health capabilities against COVID-19’. Fidler adds, ‘the US government’s demands for WHO reform, backed by the funding freeze, threaten the ability of the organisation to sustain its pandemic response … while [its] proposals are neither coherent nor credible’. As for ideas to empower the WHO over sovereign states, such as Australia’s proposal to give the WHO the right to enter countries to investigate an outbreak, they are simply ‘dead before arrival’, Fidler concludes.

On international cooperation to fight COVID-19, Belinda Townsend in another feature this week suggests that Australia could play a greater role in the region by voicing support for the voluntary pool proposed by Costa Rica ‘for sharing rights to technologies for the detection, prevention, control and treatment of COVID-19 at the upcoming World Health Assembly’, later this month.

Australia has much to do to make up lost diplomatic ground and get its priorities in international cooperation on COVID-19 back on track. A more strategic foreign policy, after early success in containing the virus at home, might be directed at working closely with its neighbours, some still desperately fighting the pandemic, to manage a speedy recovery from the crisis. China must naturally be a central part of the cooperation effort, given its experience, expertise and resources. National action to arrest the pandemic now needs to be combined with proactive regional and global coordination on public health, food security, fiscal, financial and trade policies if there is to be anything like the promise of a full V-shaped recovery from its effects.

The EAF Editorial Board is located in the Crawford School of Public Policy, College of Asia and the Pacific, The Australian National University.

This article is part of an EAF special feature series on the novel coronavirus crisis and its impact.

Courtesy:East Asia Forum

Facing the greatest economic crisis since the Great Depression

11 May 2020

Authors: Yves Tiberghien, UBC, Alan S Alexandroff, University of Toronto and Colin Bradford, Brookings

Three months into the COVID-19 crisis, the world is not only facing a pandemic that keeps claiming lives, but also the greatest economic crisis since the 1930s. Growth has turned negative, unemployment keeps rising, trade is collapsing, capital flows are fleeing emerging markets, and remittances are falling.

It is impossible to know if this shock to our interdependent system will fade away in a ‘V-shape’ recovery by 2021 or break critical components in the global architecture. What we do know is this: the collective actions of systemically important players and international institutions will determine whether the international system bounces back from this crisis.

The field of international political economy has taught observers two key lessons over the years: the global economic system is prone to different shocks and when important countries face them early and together, the system can be saved. When leading states engage in nationally derived tit-for-tat strategic interactions, the system breaks down.

The crisis hit amid trade conflict and security tensions. Every major summit or international organisation now directs some of its attention towards the US–China confrontation. Effective multilateralism by the principal powers is not working well.

The good news is that global institutions at the ministerial or technical levels are performing well. This second line of defence is providing some degree of collective action. Central banks and national stimulus packages in major countries are also playing an important role.

Relying on these mid-level links and institutions comes with a cost: they cannot provide the strategic vision needed to turn the crisis into an opportunity. They are unable to capitalise on the global demands of the current circumstances and use them to usher in a better collective future with greater social cohesion and more sustainable life.

The April 2020 annual growth forecast showed a drop of 6.3 per cent compared to estimates made in January. As IMF Chief Economist Gita Gopinath argued, ‘this makes the Great Lockdown the worst recession since the Great Depression, and far worse than the Global Financial Crisis … for the first time since the Great Depression both advanced economies and emerging market and developing economies are in recession’.

The projected growth rate for advanced economies is -6.1 per cent for 2020 and -2.2 per cent for emerging economies. These figures exclude China which is projected to grow at 1.2 per cent. All estimates assume the pandemic and confinement measures will end by June. Otherwise, economic growth will be much worse.

According to the World Trade Organization, trade may fall by anywhere between 13 and 32 per cent in 2020. Global remittances towards low and middle income countries are projected to fall by 20 per cent, a loss of US$100 billion. Capital flows are fleeing emerging and developing countries at a much faster pace than during the global financial crisis of 2008. Consequently, many countries are facing negative currency movements. In the first quarter of 2020 alone, several major countries — including Brazil, Columbia, Mexico, Russia and South Africa — faced currency drops relative to the US dollar of 20 per cent or more. This increases the burden of dollar-denominated debt — a replay of 1997.

Yet, several positive developments in global leadership are noteworthy. Major central banks are providing liquidity to the system and helping countries distribute massive domestic stimuli. The US Federal Reserve stopped purchasing bonds between 2015–2019, reducing its holdings to 15 per cent of GDP by late 2019. In the first quarter of 2020, US holdings fell to about 4 per cent. The Bank of Japan owns 40 per cent of Japanese outstanding government bonds and announced on 27 April that it was removing an upper limit on bond purchases and would also increase purchases of corporate bonds.

The G20 meeting of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors approved a proposal by IMF and World Bank leaders to issue a ‘suspension of debt service payments for the poorest countries’. The suspension is significant not only because it represents a rapid decision agreed to by major powers, but it also brought China closer to the Paris Club of creditors.

Amid highly visible US–China tensions and intra-EU disappointments, and despite continued security tension in the East China Sea, bilateral relations between China and Japan are better than expected. Mutual compassion and shipments of masks and other equipment in both directions from January to March may have ‘upended generations of China-Japan antagonism’. Neither side has blamed the other and early generosity from Japanese society and the private sector towards China has had a positive impact on public opinion.

The Japan-led Asian Development Bank (ADB) and China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) have shifted their respective funding priorities towards emergency lending to their members for COVID-19 expenses in the range of US$5–10 billion each. To see such mutually reinforcing actions announced at the same time by two rival institutions is remarkable. While the ADB has funded health before, this is a big shift for the AIIB. It signals its readiness to go beyond infrastructure funding.

Global supply chains are under great duress as a result of both the US–China trade war and the COVID-19 economic crisis. Medical and electronic supply chains are likely to evolve and regionalise. Incentives and threats will be used by the United States and others to bring some critical supply chains home. But while the data so far indicates some lateral moves within regions, supply chains are proving quite resilient.

The COVID-19 pandemic hit the global economy particularly hard because it arrived during a mega geopolitical battle. Many forget that our modern and open civilisation depends on a poorly institutionalised global interdependence. The interconnected economy and any sense of common global destiny are being tested. Leaders of great powers are adding to the global risks. Fortunately, past investment in global institutions and webs of bilateral and regional relations are providing a partial safety net, even if they cannot provide the strategic vision that humanity now needs.

Yves Tiberghien is Professor of Political Science, The University of British Columbia, and Co-Chair of the Vision20.

Alan Alexandroff is Director of the Global Summitry Project at the Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, The University of Toronto, and Co-Chair of the Vision20.

Colin Bradford is a non-resident Senior Fellow of the Global Economy and Development Program at the Brookings Institution and Co-Chair of the Vision20.

This article is part of an EAF special feature series on the novel coronavirus crisis and its impact.

 

Courtesy:East Asia Forum

Tracing the problems with Singapore’s COVID-19 app

9 May 2020

Author: Howard Lee, Murdoch University

The Singapore government won international acclaim for its deft handling of the COVID-19 crisis in its early months. The country was praised for its ability to activate an efficient contact tracing system to track down possible cases and implement strict quarantine measures to reduce community infection.

The initial low rate of infection, coupled with the quick closure of borders to COVID-19 hotspots around the world, prompted Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong to declare that the virus was under control in Singapore. He also elevated Singapore as a model for other nations to follow.

The government introduced ‘TraceTogether’, a mobile phone app developed by the Government Technology Agency (GovTech) to enhance contract tracing efforts. It used what the government dubbed the ‘bluetrace protocol’ — technology leveraging the Bluetooth feature on mobile phones to track proximity between users and record extended face-to-face encounters.

GovTech claims that the app is non-intrusive and uses an encrypted ‘digital handshake’ between devices. The data is stored on users’ mobile devices until contact tracing is activated. Users will be asked to grant permission for the data to be sent to the Ministry of Health for contact tracing.

By using Bluetooth technology, TraceTogether claims to have side-stepped the data collection issues associated with contact tracing inventions that governments in Israel, South Korea and Hong Kong are facing. Other technologies use global positioning system (GPS) data to pin-point the location of individuals who flout quarantine rules or are near quarantined locations.

There were over 620,000 downloads of TraceTogether within the first three days of its launch. This prompted the government to release the source codes free for use around the world. But attention on the application took a backseat to the resurgence of COVID-19 cases in Singapore in late March. The government imposed a ‘circuit breaker’ in early April, putting the country in a lockdown that severely restricts personal movement and non-essential services.

Singapore’s early success was far from consummate. And the contribution of TraceTogether in efforts to contain the virus was limited, something that even GovTech admitted. But this did not stop other countries from considering or adopting a similar solution.

Australia and New Zealand, which both implemented an early lockdown and saw improvements in infection figures, are now considering a gradual exit strategy. Australia released its own mobile app in late April, while New Zealand is also toying with the prospect of rolling out a version of TraceTogether to help track infection cases once lockdown restrictions are eased.

Where these countries differ from Singapore is the general unease among their citizens about the privacy and surveillance issues associated with such applications. Singaporeans might be more inclined to support a government-enforced nation-wide adoption drive.

Reviews of TraceTogether by application developers are mixed. Some praise its simplicity and privacy protection, while others raise concerns about how some features could potentially allow backdoor access to user data. Bluetooth technology, if not used properly, can expose user data to security breaches.

There is little clarity about whether such data can be sent to the government for broader surveillance use, aside from repeated assurances that the application does not collect location data. GovTech has also failed to clarify how future updates of the application might prevent the risk of political abuse through tracking targeted individuals.

The effectiveness of the application is also debatable. It does not assist users trying to insulate themselves from the virus. South Korea’s ‘Corona 100m’ application prompts users when they wander into a COVID-19 cluster, allowing them to take necessary precautions.

TraceTogether deals with what happens after the fact — the process of contact tracing by the government after a confirmed infection. But overdependence on the application might lull users into a false sense of security, allowing them to feel safe to interact freely and unknowingly exacerbate the rate of infection.

The Singapore government continues to push for the adoption of the app, but combatting the pandemic still hinges more on public communication and sound health management policies. Singapore’s latest spike in cases was mostly from foreign worker dormitories where thousands have been quarantined in close proximity to each other. The value of the application is limited in situations where maintaining robust social distancing is more crucial.

The government also declared that should users be contacted by the Ministry of Health for contact tracing, they must submit to having the authorities access their stored data, or be prosecuted under the Infectious Diseases Act.

But the law (passed in 1976 and revised in 2003) is vague and subject to interpretation. It suggests that users are required by law to provide data to the government and do not have full control over the data stored on their mobile devices.

The deeper issues with TraceTogether should give pause to countries keen to use it. Governments need to properly clarify issues surrounding effectiveness, hacking, state surveillance and the management of personal data. Citizens need to be mindful that if such applications are backed by draconian laws, it could void their privacy and basic human rights.

The urgency of tackling COVID-19 must not permit a false choice between the prevention of infections and the rights of citizens. Both can and should coexist. And while Australians and New Zealanders are less likely to trust their governments than Singaporeans, the ability of this pandemic to challenge healthy political scepticism cannot be underestimated.

Howard Lee is a PhD candidate researching media governance in Singapore at the Asia Research Centre, Murdoch University, Perth.

This article is part of an EAF special feature series on the novel coronavirus crisis and its impact.

Can Japan and South Korea cooperate against COVID-19?

9 May 2020

Author: Kazuhiko Togo, Kyoto Sangyo University

In 2019 Japan–ROK relations were their worst since the normalisation of diplomatic relations in 1965. Historical memory haunts the two countries and the wartime forced-labour issue played a significant role in their recent trade dispute. So far, the COVID-19 crisis has not had a big impact on the rigid relationship. But South Korean success and Japanese failure in dealing with COVID-19 might open a tiny window of opportunity to renew cooperation and establish a more trustworthy relationship between the two countries.

In his speech to commemorate the Korean independence movement on 1 March 2020, ROK President Moon Jae-in made a strong plea to the South Korean people to overcome the COVID-19 crisis. He also mentioned working with Japan to overcome the crisis jointly and ‘establish future-oriented cooperative relations’.

In this speech, Moon’s rebuking of Japan’s 1910 annexation of Korea has been more moderate than his predecessors. In spite of Moon’s approach, Japan has largely failed — across government, opinion leaders and the media — to recognise or appreciate his positive signalling for greater cooperation.

South Korea’s COVID-19 outbreak exploded in mid-February after a mass gathering of a religious organisation and the number of infections spiked rapidly, rising from 30 to 2300 in ten days. The Moon government acted quickly and efficiently to combat the outbreak. It rolled out an effective polymerase chain reaction (PCR) testing system to track the virus. A system was introduced to let hospitals quarantine ‘seriously affected patients’ and to isolate ‘lightly affected patients’ in other institutions.

Japan’s aloofness to President Moon’s call for cooperation could be seen, from a South Korean perspective, as disregarding South Korea’s success in fighting COVID-19.

On 5 March, Japan implemented travel restrictions requiring South Koreans arriving in Japan to undergo a two-week period of quarantine. The following day South Korean Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha met the Japanese ambassador in Seoul and protested that the decision ‘was not only unfriendly but unscientific’ and that ‘South Korea will be bound to take reciprocal measures’. She emphasised that there was no prior notice or consultation about the restrictions.

Most Japanese media outlets reported that these new travel restrictions were in line with Japan’s travel ban against China. COVID-19 originally spread from Wuhan and the timing of the travel ban was associated with the decision to postpone Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Japan. Though the number of COVID-19 patients was still rising in South Korea, there was a clear lack of willingness to cooperate on the part of the Japanese government.

It was only on 20 March that a more positive Japanese attitude began to emerge after the foreign ministers of Japan, China and South Korea held a teleconference on COVID-19. Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a list of cooperation projects which the three countries are supposed to carry out together. Subsequent Japan–ROK director-general talks on 1 April positively noted the ministerial talks that took place on 20 March.

On 14 April, the ASEAN+3 (Japan, China, South Korea) online summit on COVID-19 took place. The positive tone on issues of international cooperation was preserved in its adopted communique.

But despite these developments, there is little evidence of real and concrete cooperation between Japan and South Korea.

On 15 April, South Korea held an election for its national assembly. The ruling Democratic Party and the Platform Party won 180 seats while the opposition conservative United Future Party and the Future Korea Party secured only 103 seats. The Japanese media overwhelmingly commented that voters supported Moon for his successful fight against COVID-19.

This should provide a strong incentive for the Japanese government to think more seriously and perhaps learn from Moon’s successes.

In late March, Nobel Laureate Professor Shinya Yamanaka — concerned by a lack of government action in Japan — created a simple website to inform the public about COVID-19. Yamanaka suggested a number of actions, including protecting hospitals and other medical care institutions to prevent ‘medical collapse’ and swift PCR testing. These actions represent the essence of the South Korean policy since the middle of February.

On 4 May Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe extended the nationwide state of emergency, now set in place until 31 May. He had first announced a nationwide state of emergency only on 16 April.

On 20 April, the number of COVID-19 cases (10,797) in Japan surpassed those in South Korea (10,674). Since then infections in Japan have risen sharply to 14,623 (470 deaths), while the South Korean figure has long flattened, as of 2 May at 10,780 (250 deaths).

These figures highlight South Korean success and Japanese failure in their respective wars against COVID-19. It is shocking that as late as 16 March, the number of infections in South Korea was 8236, the fourth largest in the world, whereas in Japan the number of infections was only 835.

The Japanese media is anticipating that President Moon’s double victory — against COVID-19 and in the legislative election — will lead him to take a tougher position on the wartime forced-labour issue.

Yet there is an opportunity for cooperation rather than confrontation. If Prime Minister Abe could show more humility in acknowledging Moon’s success and a willingness to learn from his COVID-19 strategy, Moon might cooperate with Abe in real terms to help Japan’s fight against the pandemic.

Kazuhiko Togo is Guest Professor at Kyoto Sangyo University.

This article is part of an EAF special feature series on the novel coronavirus crisis and its impact.

Courtesy:East Asia Forum

COVID-19: from conflict to pandemic, migrants in Bosnia face a new challe

    

3 April 2020

Migrants and Refugees

Migrants and refugees hosted at UN-run reception centres in Bosnia-Herzegovina, are learning to cope with the disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

“We fled from home to save our lives, to escape war, and now we are faced with this new coronavirus”, says Rozhan, Along with her husband, Ibrahim, and her three children, she made a long and arduous journey from Iraq, her home country, to Bosnia-Herzegovina in Europe.

The family are hosted at the Borići reception centre in Bihać, managed by UN Migration (IOM) along with 315 other migrants and refugees, who have escaped conflict and violence in countries including Afghanistan, Pakistan and Syria.

Read more »